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The North Carolina Supreme Court Threatens
Federalism in Eways v. Governor's Island
Our nation's founders, seeking an "equilibrium between the general and the
State governments," 1 framed a constitution based on principles of federalism:
the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to
the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other
objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary be-
tween the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide
is to be established under the general government. But this does not
change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially
made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and
most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. 2
Federal court abstention is a natural outgrowth of these federalist ideals.
The doctrine of abstention permits a federal court to relinquish jurisdiction to a
state court to avoid conflict with a state's interpretation of its own laws or ad-
ministration of its own afairs? In Eways v. Governor's Island4 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court denied its responsibility to decide a case brought to it
through federal court abstention. The court's decision in Eways subverts the
federalist goals of abstention doctrine and sets forth a new rule restricting the
effective exercise of jurisdiction by both North Carolina courts and federal
courts sitting in North Carolina.
In Eways, the North Carolina Supreme Court confronted the question
whether state courts must dismiss actions already pending in a federal court
within the state, even though the federal court has abstained from ruling pre-
cisely in order to permit the state court to decide state-law issues in the case.
Taking a less precise view of the issue, the supreme court stated that Eways
presented the question whether North Carolina considers a prior action pending
in a federal court located within the state to be grounds for abating5 a subse-
quent action between the same parties on the same grounds in a North Carolina
court.6 Without taking note of the case's abstention context, the court answered
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 197 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
2. Id. No. 39, at 245-46 (J. Madison).
3. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 9 (5th ed. 1979).
4. 326 N.C. 552, 391 S.E.2d 182 (1990).
5. Abatement is an overthrow or destruction of a suit so that it is quashed and ended.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (5th ed. 1979). Under the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a
motion to dismiss serves essentially the same function as the former plea in abatement. Compare
N.C.R. CIV. PRO. 7(c) ("[P]leas ... shall not be used.") with N.C.R. CIV. PRO. 8(e) ("No technical
forms of pleading or motions are required.") and N.C.R. CIV. PRO. 12 (motions to dismiss). See
Lehrer v. Edgecombe Mfg. Co., 13 N.C. App. 412, 414, 185 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1972) ("ITihe dismissal
presents essentially the same questions as did the old plea of abatement."); see also Gardner v. Gard-
ner, 294 N.C. 172, 175 n.5, 240 S.E.2d 399, 403 n.5 (1978) (noting that the Supreme Court of Alaska
has held that a motion to abate is the equivalent of a motion to dismiss). See generally I C.J.S.
Abatement and Revival § 53 (1985) (discussing law of abatement); 1 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA
INDEX, Abatement, Survival, and Revival of Actions, §§ 3-14 (4th ed. 1990) (same).
6. Eways, 326 N.C. at 560, 391 S.E.2d at 186.
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this question affirmatively, holding that a prior action pending in a federal court
in North Carolina constitutes grounds for abating a subsequent state action on
substantially similar grounds between the same parties.7
This Note recounts the tangled facts of Eways and explains the develop-
ment and purposes of abstention doctrine. The Note concludes that the North
Carolina Supreme Court's failure to recognize the importance of abstention doc-
trine renders the Eways rule fundamentally flawed. The Note concedes that the
court's new rule of abatement for a prior pending action may be appropriate in
situations not involving federal-court abstention; it recommends, however, that
the supreme court reannounce the rule in a suitable context to avoid undermin-
ing abstention doctrine.8
The Eways litigation began with bankruptcy proceedings involving the own-
ership of North Carolina coastal property by two partnerships: Governor's Is-
land, a North Carolina limited partnership, fied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina;
the Allen Dukes-Jones Island Partnership fied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia.9 At a pub-
lic sale of the debtors' island property, Joseph M. Eways was the high bidder,
and the parties entered into a sales contract. 10 Following a series of misunder-
standings on both sides concerning, among other things, the quality of title to
the property, no closing took place." As a result, the debtors held a second
auction, whereupon another purchaser bought the island for a price significantly
less than plaintiff's earlier bid. 12
7. Id. at 561, 391 S.E.2d at 187. In so holding, the supreme court adopted the minority rule.
Id. at 560, 391 S.E.2d at 187.
8. Almost any context not involving abstention would be suitable for abatement of a prior
pending federal action. For example, in Barringer v. Zgoda, 91 A.D.2d 811, 458 N.Y.S.2d 42
(1982), the state court properly dismissed the defendant's counterclaim because she had a separate
action pending in the United States District Court against the plaintiffs and the district court had not
abstained. Id. at 811, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
9. Eways, 326 N.C. at 554, 391 S.E.2d at 183. The two debtor partnerships share an owner-
ship interest in an island known as Governor's Island or Jones Island, located in Pamlico County,
North Carolina. Id.
10. Id. at 555, 391 S.E.2d at 183.
11. Id. Eways, a resident of Florida, had learned of the sale from newspaper advertisements.
Id. On the morning of the sale, Eways arrived late; he had not visited the island, nor had he
searched the property's title. Id. Just before the sale, the auctioneer announced that the island was
being sold subject to the rights of third parties owning fifty percent of certain mineral rights, that a
large part of the island was nontransferable marshland, and that a third party owned approximately
fifteen acres of the island not included in the sale. Id. at 554, 391 S.E.2d at 183. Eways claimed
never to have heard these announcements. See In re Governor's Island, 45 Bankr. 247, 251 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1984). Relying solely on the representations in the newspaper advertisements, Eways of-
fered a bid of $1,960,000 for the entire island. Eways, 326 N.C. at 555, 391 S.E.2d at 184. The terms
of the sale required Eways to deposit fifteen percent of the purchase price, or $294,000, with the
auction company pending closing. Id. In fact, Eways deposited only $184,000 with the court; he
deposited that amount only after his bank returned his first checks unpaid to the auction company.
Id. Eways subsequently told the debtors that, because the marshland and mineral rights restrictions
impaired title to the land, he could not obtain financing for the purchase and would not be able to
close on the property. Id.
12. Eways, 326 N.C. at 555-56, 391 S.E.2d at 184. The eventual purchase price for the island
was $1,100,000, or $860,000 less than the amount plaintiff had bid at the first auction. Id. at 556,
391 S.E.2d at 184.
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Following the second sale, the debtors instituted an adversary proceeding
against Eways in the bankruptcy court, seeking reimbursement of the shortfall
in purchase price. 13 The bankruptcy court then conducted a hearing on the
matter and entered judgment in the debtors' favor in the amount of $294,000,
representing the fifteen percent of Eways' bid required as a security deposit.1 4
The parties appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.15
The district court elected to abstain from resolving the issues regarding the
state of the property's title and related matters.16 That court reserved the right
to decide the issues presented in the adversary proceeding, should the parties be
unable to obtain relief in state court.17 Pursuant to the district court's absten-
tion order, Eways filed an action in the Superior Court of Pamlico County re-
questing the return of his security deposit.18
The debtors, defendants in the state court action, moved to dismiss.' 9
13. Id. at 556, 391 S.E.2d at 184. When Eways first told the debtors that he would not be able
to close the sale, Governor's Island applied to the bankruptcy court to order forfeiture of his security
deposit. Id. The bankruptcy court concluded that Eways had breached his obligation to purchase
the property, but nonetheless allowed him additional time to close; Eways missed the second dead-
line as well. Id. The debtor held the second public auction after the second deadline had passed. Id.
14. Id. The bankruptcy court made extensive findings of fact at this hearing and applied princi-
ples of both federal and North Carolina law. See In re Governor's Island, 45 Bankr. 247, 254-58
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984). The bankruptcy court found that "Eways had every opportunity to inquire
into any of the sellers' representations, but neglected to do so. He entered into the contract at his
own risk." Id. at 254. The court also stated the general rule that, when a bidder at a bankruptcy
sale fails to close on the property, the purchaser "may be ordered to pay the deficiency resulting
from a resale." Id. at 256. The bankruptcy court noted, however, that this principle may not apply
when, as here, the sale contract contains a liquidated damages clause. Id. at 256-57. The parties'
agreement stated in clear, unambiguous language that " '[i]f the balance is not paid when due, de-
posit shall be retained by seller as liquidated damages.'" Id. at 257 (emphasis added by the court).
The bankruptcy court concluded that this clause was not unconscionable to either party and assessed
damages equal to the amount of the security deposit. Id. at 258.
15. Eways, 326 N.C. at 556, 391 S.E.2d at 184. Title 28 of the United States Code authorizes
district court judges to hear appeals from the bankruptcy court's final decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)
(1988).
16. Eways, 326 N.C. at 556, 391 S.E.2d at 184. In its August 1985 abstention order, the district
court explained its reasons for abstaining as follows:
Eways has raised issues, apparently in good faith, as to the quality of [the] title to the
property which was the subject of their contract. Such issues of title conceivably could
involve hundreds of thousands of acres of land in Eastern North Carolina, to-wit, the clas-
sification of real property as "marshland," and validity of title to land beyond the high
water mark of the tides but which is non-navigable in fact due to tidal swamp, marsh
growth, etc. These issues are of grave importance and are of the largest magnitude and it is
the view of this Court that in the interest of justice, and in the interest of comity with the
courts of the State of North Carolina, and out of respect for its law, this Court should
abstain from deciding the issues presented in the Adversary Proceeding.
Memorandum in Support of Order at 12, In re Governor's Island, 45 Bankr. 247 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1984) (No. 85-344-CIV-5).
17. Eways, 326 N.C. at 556, 391 S.E.2d at 184.
18. See id. Eways' complaint alleged two grounds for relief: Breach of contract, on the theory
that the debtor failed to convey good and marketable title as the parties' sale contract had required,
and fraud, on the theory that the debtors misrepresented their ownership interest in the island and
failed to disclose title defects. Id.
19. Id. Defendants' four grounds for dismissal were as follows: 1) lack of subject matter juris-
diction, 2) lack of personal jurisdiction, 3) failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
and 4) abatement due to a prior pending action. Id.
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More than two years later,20 the trial court granted defendants' motion, con-
cluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction'over the controversy.21 Plain-
tiff appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the suit on the same ground. 22
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous opinion by
Justice Martin, basing its holding not on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but
on the doctrine of prior action pending.23 Noting that jurisdictions differ over
the question of whether a prior action pending in a federal court sitting in the
same state will abate a subsequent state court action,24 the court adopted the
minority rule, stating:
Where a prior action is pending in a federal court within the bounda-
ries of North Carolina which raises substantially the same issues be-
tween substantially the same parties as a subsequent action within the
state court system having concurrent jurisdiction, the subsequent ac-
tion is wholly unnecessary and, in the interests of judicial economy,
should be subject to a plea in abatement. 25
The supreme court, like the court of appeals, based its holding in Eways on
the 1930 case of Gilliam v. Sanders.26 In Gilliam, a court-appointed bankruptcy
trustee sued a defaulting buyer of estate property in state court for failing to
comply with his bid at a judicial sale.27 The North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's suit, reasoning that
"[in] a proceeding to sell land for assets the court of equity has all the
powers necessary to accomplish its purpose, and when relief can be
20. The J.L. Todd Auction Company, the firm that had conducted the 1984 judicial sale, inter-
vened as an additional defendant in the state court action in January 1988. Id. at 558-59, 391 S.E.2d
at 186. "As the selling agent... [the auction company] may be entitled to some or all of the deposit
money in controversy." Id. at 558-59, 391 S.E.2d at 186.
21. Id. at 557, 391 S.E.2d at 185. This was the first of the four grounds for dismissal set forth in
defendants' February 1986 motion to dismiss. Id. at 556, 391 S.E.2d at 184. The trial court did not
address defendants' assertion that the prior pending federal action should abate the state court suit.
Id. at 557, 391 S.E.2d at 185.
22. Eways v. Governor's Island, 95 N.C. App. 201, 202, 382 S.E.2d 219, 219 (1989), aff'd, 326
N.C. 552, 391 S.E.2d 182 (1990). The court of appeals, relying heavily on Gilliam v. Sanders, 198
N.C. 635, 152 S.E. 888 (1930), held that "a federal court cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction
upon a state court where the highest court of this State has ruled that no such state court jurisdiction
exists." Eways, 95 N.C. App. at 203, 382 S.E.2d at 220; see infra text accompanying note 29. Like
the trial court, the court of appeals ignored defendants' contention that the prior pending federal
action should abate the subsequent state action. Eways, 326 N.C. at 557, 391 S.E.2d at 185.
23. Eways, 326 N.C. at 553-54, 391 S.E.2d at 183. During the previous year, the supreme court
reached a result similar to that in Eways, stating that "[i]f the correct result has been reached, the
judgment will not be disturbed even though the trial court may not have assigned the correct reason
for the judgment entered." Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989). The
Eways court quoted this language to support its own decision. Eways, 326 N.C. at 553-54, 391
S.E.2d at 183. In Shore, the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment based on res
judicata, and the court of appeals had failed to consider the doctrine of prior action pending. Shore,
324 N.C. at 428, 378 S.E.2d at 779. Nevertheless, the supreme court noted that "the record and
[defendant's] motion clearly support the doctrine of prior action pending as a basis for summary
judgment." Id. at 428-29, 378 S.E.2d at 779. Justice Martin also authored the Shore decision.
Shore, 324 N.C. at 427, 378 S.E.2d at 779.
24. Eways, 326 N.C. at 559-60, 391 S.E.2d at 186-87.
25. Id. at 560-61, 391 S.E.2d at 187.
26. 198 N.C. 635, 152 S.E. 888 (1930). See Eways, 326 N.C. at 557, 391 S.E.2d at 185.
27. Gilliam, 198 N.C. at 636, 152 S.E. at 889.
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given in the pending action, it must be done by a motion in the cause
and not by an independent action. The latter is allowed only when the
matter has been closed by a final judgment."28
The court of appeals relied on Gilliam to affirm the trial court's dismissal of
the complaint, noting that Gilliam's policy "of keeping all proceedings related to
the bankrupt's property within the equity jurisdiction of the District Court to
avoid multiplicious suits, costs, and needless delay" supported dismissal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 29 The supreme court stated that it agreed with
this analysis of the underlying rationale for the Gilliam holding, and specifically
found that the language and intent of the Gilliam decision were consistent with
the legal theory of abatement due to a prior action pending in federal court.30
Thus, nearly five years after the district court had directed the parties to seek a
resolution of their dispute in state court, the supreme court ended their quest for
relief. Well into 1991, the parties continued to pursue relief in the federal sys-
tem.31 Eways is a striking example of a case in which "the two possible forums
available to [the parties] have each indefinitely denied them any relief in hopes
that the other forum will take up their cause."'32
On its face, the North Carolina Supreme Court's analysis of Eways seems
complete. The court portrayed its decision to dismiss the action because of a
prior pending action as an inevitable result of Gilliam. A further examination of
Eways' legal background, however, reveals fundamental errors in the court's rea-
soning--errors stemming from the court's failure to consider Eways' abstention
posture. This background indicates that the Eways rule is a threat to the federal-
ist ideal of maintaining an "equilibrium" 33 between state and federal courts, as
expressed in abstention doctrine.
Abstention doctrine presumes that the federal court has jurisdiction over
the matter, but chooses either not to exercise its jurisdiction or to postpone its
exercise until the state courts have interpreted state-law issues in the case.34
Upon abstaining, the federal court sends the parties to state court for relief.35
There is no single rule of abstention; the doctrine is a collection of policies based
28. Id. at 637, 152 S.E. at 889-90 (quoting Marsh v. Nimmocks, 122 N.C. 478,479,29 S.E. 840,
840 (1898)).
29. Eways v. Governor's Island, 95 N.C. App. 201, 204, 382 S.E.2d 219, 220 (1989), aff'd, 326
N.C. 552, 391 S.E.2d 182 (1990); see supra note 22.
30. Eways, 326 N.C. at 558, 391 S.E.2d at 185.
31. Telephone interview with Douglas Q. Wickham, counsel for defendant Allen Dukes-Jones
Island Partnership (Apr. 18, 1991); telephone interview with B. Hunt Baxter, Jr., counsel for plain-
tiff (Jan. 29, 1991).
32. Trapnell v. Hunter, 785 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 197 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also supra text
accompanying notes 1-2 (discussing federalism).
34. H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 690 (2d ed.
1987); see also Galligan, Article III and The "Related To" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Case Study in
Protective Jurisdiction, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 15 n.54 (1987) (Abstention is a doctrine a
federal court "invokes when it has jurisdiction but for any number of compelling reasons decides not
to exercise that jurisdiction.").
35. See generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 302-19 (4th ed. 1983)
(discussing abstention doctrine).
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on principles of comity and federalism. 36 Abstention doctrine may embrace
nearly any case in which concerns of federalism prompt a federal court to yield
jurisdiction to a state court. 37 A federal court, however, does not have unlim-
ited discretion to abstain: abstention is an exception to the well-known rule of
Cohens v. Virginia,38 in which Chief Justice Marshall stated that a federal court
must not decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it can properly hear the case.39
The United States Supreme Court clearly defined the doctrine of abstention
half a century ago in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.4° In Pullman the
Court held that when a federal constitutional claim rests on an unsettled ques-
tion of state law, the federal court should stay its hand in order to allow the state
courts to settle the underlying state-law question.4 1 The Court recognized that
any ruling by the federal court would involve a mere prediction of the state's
interpretation of its own laws, and that it would be better to allow the state court
to construe the state statute.42 After Pullman, abstention became appropriate
for any case that could be disposed of on a narrow, but unsettled, question of
state law rather than on a federal constitutional question.4
3
In addition to Pullman abstention, federal courts today recognize several
other forms of judicially-created abstention doctrine.44 All but one of these
forms of abstention are based on "considerations of proper constitutional adjudi-
cation and regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving
the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal
36. H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, supra note 34, at 690. "Comity" describes the principle by which
the courts of one jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a
matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed.
1979).
37. See Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99, 102
(1986).
38. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
39. Id. at 404. In Cohens, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legisla-
ture may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We
cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a
case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right
to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we
would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best
judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.
Id.
40. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
41. See id. at 501; see also Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975)
(summarizing Pullman doctrine) (discussed infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text).
42. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500.
43. See Mullenix, supra note 37, at 102.
44. See, eg., C. WRIGHT, supra note 35, § 52, at 303 (discussing four types of abstention). In
addition to a Pullman situation involving both the federal Constitution and a state statute, federal
abstention may be appropriate to avoid a needless conflict with a state's administration of its own
affairs, see Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943); to leave to the states the resolution of
unsettled questions of state law, see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25,
27-30 (1959); or to foster judicial economy, see Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). Abstention also may be appropriate when federal adjudication
would interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1971). See also Mullenix, supra note 37, at 102 & n.14 (discussing the several types of abstention).
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courts or by state and federal courts."' 45 Abstention is most likely to occur,
therefore, when a federal court wishes to avoid error in interpreting state law.
46
Ordinarily, a federal court retains jurisdiction after abstaining.47 The im-
portance of deferring to state-court interpretation of state law, however, led the
United States Supreme Court to outline an abstention procedure requiring dis-
missal of a federal action in order to permit the unfettered exercise of state-court
jurisdiction. In Harris County Commissioners Court v. Moore,48 the Court noted
that the nature of the federal constitutional claim before it depended upon "the
unsettled relationship between the state constitution and a [state] statute."'49
The "difficult state-law questions" involved in Moore made federal abstention
especially appropriate.50 Concluding that "the District Court should have ab-
stained,"51 the Supreme Court took the strongest possible stand in favor of state
court jurisdiction and ordered dismissal of the case:
In order to remove any possible obstacles to state-court jurisdic-
tion, we direct the District Court to dismiss the complaint. The dis-
missal should be without prejudice so that any remaining federal claim
may be raised in a federal forum after the Texas courts have been given
the opportunity to address the state-law questions in this case. 52
Thus, the Supreme Court in Moore articulated the following standard:
When abstention is proper, but the parties would confront "obstacles to state-
court jurisdiction" if the action remained in federal court, the federal court
should dismiss the action. Because of this standard, any "obstacles" created by
state courts will compel a federal court to dismiss a case, rather than retain it on
its docket, following a decision to abstain.53
45. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. The sole type of abstention not involving such principles is
the type the Court announced in Colorado River itself. Colorado River abstention is rooted in princi-
ples of "judicial economy and sound judicial administration." Mullenix, supra note 37, at 102-03.
Professor Mullenix has criticized this type of abstention as an "unprincipled means of serving the
convenience of the federal courts," and as "nothing more than a doctrine of convenience." Id. at
103, 105.
46. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 590 (1977).
47. American Trial Lawyers' Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467, 469 (1973).
48. 420 U.S. 77 (1975).
49. Id. at 84.
50. See id. at 87-88. The Court observed that "the federal claim in this case is 'entangled in a
skein of state law that must be untangled before the federal case can proceed.'" Id. at 88 (quoting
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963)).
51. Id. at 82.
52. Id. at 88-89 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court explained its reasons for ordering dis-
missal as follows:
Ordinarily the proper course in ordering "Pullman abstention" is to remand with
instructions to retain jurisdiction but to stay the federal suit pending determination of the
state-law questions in state court.... The Texas Supreme Court has ruled, however, that it
cannot grant declaratory relief under state law if a federal court retains jurisdiction over
the federal claim.
Id. at 88 n.14 (citations omitted).
53. Federal courts continue to analyze the need for abstention in the same way by asking
whether the case presents narrow, unsettled questions of state law. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). In the face of obstacles to state-court jurisdiction, however,
federal courts deciding to abstain will dismiss a case without prejudice, rather than retain it on their
docket. See Moore, 420 U.S. at 88-89. Like the Texas rule discussed in Moore prohibiting declara-
tory relief when a federal court retains jurisdiction, the Eways rule requiring dismissal when an
1420 [Vol. 69
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Even before Pullman, the Supreme Court recognized that, in bankruptcy
cases, particular deference to state courts might be appropriate. For example, in
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.54 the Court balanced the bankruptcy
court's interest in comprehensive management of a case against the state court's
interest in determining questions of state law:
A court of bankruptcy has an exclusive and nondelegable control over
the administration of an estate in its possession. But the proper exer-
cise of that control may, where the interests of the estate and the par-
ties will best be served, lead the bankruptcy court to consent to
submission to state courts of particular controversies involving unset-
tled questions of state property law and arising in the course of bank-
ruptcy administration.55
In Thompson, a question of real estate title arose in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing and the governing state law was not clear on the issue.56 While the Court
did not doubt the bankruptcy court's authority to determine the state law ques-
tion, the "difficulties of determining just what should be the decision under the
law of [the] State" 57 led the Court to conclude as follows:
Unless the matter is referred to the state courts, upon subsequent deci-
sion by the Supreme Court of Illinois it may appear that rights in local
property of parties to this proceeding have-by the accident of federal
jurisdiction-been determined contrary to the law of the State, which
in such matters is supreme.5 8
Bolstering the Court's special view of abstention in bankruptcy cases, Con-
gress in 1984 amended the Bankruptcy Act to provide specifically for abstention
in bankruptcy.5 9 Congress' codification of abstention with respect to bank-
ruptcy is the only statutory enunciation of this doctrine; abstention remains in
all other respects a judicially created doctrine. Although Congress' statutory
authorization of abstention in bankruptcy confirms the district court's authority
to abstain, statutory abstention, like judicially created abstention, is rooted in
the concern for the sensitive relationship between state and federal courts. The
1984 amendments grew out of Congress' recognition of the constitutional diffi-
culties with bankruptcy jurisdiction that the Supreme Court previously had ex-
action is pending in federal court is an "obstacle[] to state-court jurisdiction." Id. at 88. Thus, the
Eways rule affects not only the decisions of North Carolina courts but those of federal courts sitting
in North Carolina.
54. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
55. Id. at 479 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 483.
57. Id. at 484.
58. Id. (footnote omitted). The Thompson Court's great deference to state law may have flowed
directly from its then-recent holding in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); the Court cited
Erie for the proposition that state law was supreme. See Thompson, 309 U.S. at 484 n.ll; see also
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("[Ihe law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."). Following the
Thompson decision, some observers criticized it as an extreme application of the Erie doctrine. See
Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1013, 1033-34 & n.87 (1953).
59. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1988) ("The court... may suspend all proceedings in a
case under this title .... ); 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4) (1988) ("Non-core proceedings... shall not be
subject to the mandatory abstention provisions .... ); id. § 1334(c) (1988) (abstention provisions).
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pressed in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co..6°
Because of these concerns, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to make the
bankruptcy court a subsidiary of the federal district court,61 to divide judicial
power in bankruptcy between the district court and the bankruptcy court,62 and
to confer jurisdiction in bankruptcy on the district court.63
The third of these three amendments, section 1334, contains an affirmative
grant of jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases to the federal district courts.6a Sec-
tion 1334 also contains the following provision permitting federal courts to relin-
quish jurisdiction in cases where they confront questions of state law better left
to state courts: "Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest
of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law,
from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11."65 The district court in Eways
abstained under this discretionary provision. 66
The Thompson precedent seems to provide an adequate foundation for the
district court's decision to abstain in Eways.67 A second look, however, reveals
that the district court erred. The parties' adversary proceeding in bankruptcy
court did not involve "issues ... as to the quality of ... title ... involv[ing]
hundreds of thousands of acres of land in Eastern North Carolina," nor "the
classification of real property as 'marshland,' and validity of title to land beyond
the high water mark of the tides but which is non-navigable due to tidal swamp
[or] marsh growth," nor other "issues ... of grave importance and.., of the
largest magnitude." s68 By the time of the adversary proceeding, the debtors had
resold the island at a second auction; the only remaining issue was money dam-
ages.69 Because the Eways dispute presented no complicated, unsettled question
60. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The constitutional problem with bankruptcy jurisdiction was that fed-
eral judicial power was vested in courts whose judges did not enjoy the protections and safeguards of
Article III of the United States Constitution. See id. at 62; see also U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I (To
exercise the judicial power of the United States, judges must "hold their Offices during good Behav-
ior, and shall... receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office."). See generally Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L.
REv. 953, 953 (1981) (criticizing existing bankruptcy law as a "failure").
61. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
62. Id. § 157.
63. Id. § 1334.
64. Id. § 1334(b). "Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on
a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under
title 11." Id.
65. Id. § 1334(c)(1).
66. See Memorandum in Support of Order at 14, In re Governor's Island, 45 Bankr. 247
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (No. 85-344-CIV-5) (discussed supra note 16).
67. See Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 483 (1940). Thompson proclaims
that it is proper to submit "unsettled questions of state property law" to state court, Id.; see also
supra note 16 (district court's abstention order) & notes 54-58 and accompanying text (discussing
Thompson holding).
68. Memorandum in Support of Order at 12, Governor's Island, (No. 85-344-CIV-5) (discussed
supra note 16).
69. See Eways, 326 N.C. at 555-56, 391 S.E.2d at 184; see also supra notes 10-14 and accompa-
nying text (discussing facts of case).
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of state law, abstention was improper. 70 The district court, however, faced the
decision of whether to abstain in 1985, in an atmosphere of great uncertainty
following the Supreme Court's 1982 Marathon decision and Congress' 1984
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.71 At that time, the district court would
have been influenced by binding authority requiring abstention whenever "im-
portant matters of state policy" are involved.72 In the following years, however,
the law aligned itself against ordering abstention in bankruptcy proceedings. 73
Nonetheless, the district court in Eways did abstain, and the parties thus
came before the courts of North Carolina. In considering the dispute in Eways,
however, the North Carolina Supreme Court appeared unaware of the case's
abstention context, as the court did not discuss abstention.74 Instead, it based its
decision solely upon an analysis of the law of prior action pending.
The supreme court set forth the following general rule regarding the law of
prior action pending: "Under the law of this state, where a prior action is pend-
ing between the same parties for the same subject matter in a court within the
state having like jurisdiction, the prior action serves to abate the subsequent
action."'75 Traditionally, North Carolina courts have confronted the question
whether to dismiss a case because of a prior pending action through three recur-
ring fact patterns.
The first of the traditional situations involves two suits within the same
state system; both of the cases that the Eways court cited as representing the
general rule involved two such suits.76 In this situation, the policy underlying
70. See, eg., In re Aristera Co., 65 Bankr. 928, 931 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986). "The matters of
state law alleged in the Complaint are neither novel nor complicated and, thus, neither the interest of
comity with state courts nor respect for state law require that this Court abstain." Id.
71. See generally Ferriell, Actions to Collect Unpaid Accounts in Bankruptcy Court, 26 Hous. L.
REV. 603, 605-06 (1989) (The Marathon decision "threw the bankruptcy court system into a crisis
from which it has not completely recovered.").
72. Aluminum Co. of America v. Utilities Comm'n, 713 F.2d 1024, 1029 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984). In Aluminum Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that Burford abstention was proper "to avoid needless obstruction of North Carolina's
domestic policy" when interpretation of a North Carolina Utilities Commission order was necessary.
Id.; see supra note 44.
73. See, eg., In re Earla Indus., Inc., 72 Bankr. 131, 134 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (abstention
inappropriate when state law is settled).
74. The court acknowledged the existence of the bankruptcy abstention statutes, but did not
explain their operation or their possible effect on the case. See Eways, 326 N.C. at 557, 391 S.E.2d at
185.
75. Id. at 558, 391 S.E.2d at 185. The court pointed to its earlier decisions in McDowell v.
Blythe Bros. Co., 236 N.C. 396, 72 S.E.2d 860 (1952), and Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68
S.E.2d 796 (1952), as examples of this long-standing rule. Eways, 326 N.C. at 558, 391 S.E.2d at
185. The Cameron court had set forth the rule as follows: "The pendency of a prior action between
the same parties for the same cause in a State court of competent jurisdiction works in [sic] abate-
ment of a subsequent action either in the same court or in another court of the State having like
jurisdiction." Cameron, 235 N.C. at 84, 68 S.E.2d at 798.
76. Cf. Gardner v. Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 173, 176, 240 S.E.2d 399, 401, 403 (1978) (huiband
should have filed claim in second divorce action in Johnston County as a counterclaim to first di-
vorce action in Wayne County). Compare McDowell, 236 N.C. at 396-97, 72 S.E.2d at 861 (prior
action pending in the superior court of Randolph County is grounds for abatement of subsequent
action in the superior court of Mecklenburg County) with Cameron, 235 N.C. at 84, 88, 68 S.E.2d at
798, 800 (prior action pending in the superior court of Sampson County is grounds for abatement of
subsequent action in the superior court of New Hanover County).
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the doctrine is understandable; as the court had stated earlier, "the second ac-
tion is abated by the action which is first in point of time because the court can
dispose of the entire controversy in the prior action and in consequence the sub-
sequent action is wholly unnecessary."' 77 In Eways, the supreme court con-
cluded that a policy of judicial economy is consistent with the policy of Gilliam
v. Sanders,78 because the "'policy expressed in Gilliam is that of keeping all
proceedings related to the bankrupt's property within the equity jurisdiction of
the District Court to avoid multiplicitous suits, costs, and needless delay.' "79
North Carolina courts also have faced the question whether to dismiss a
case because of a prior pending action when a case comes before a state court
predated by an action in another state. 80 Here, the rule requiring dismissal does
not apply.81 Indeed, in addressing this situation, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has laid down a contrary rule explicitly prohibiting abatement:
A plea in abatement seeking dismissal of an action, because an-
other action is pending between the same parties on the same right of
action, should be sustained when, and only when, the actions are pend-
ing in different courts of the same sovereign. If the actions are brought
in courts of different states, the plea should be overruled.82
This rule, in effect, states the necessary inverse of the rule of the first situation: if
the pendency of an action within the state requires abatement of a second action
within the same state,83 then "a similar action pending in the courts of any other
jurisdiction will not abate an action between the same parties in the North Caro-
lina courts."'84
In a third situation, a dispute comes before a North Carolina court follow-
ing the commencement of an action in a federal court located in another state.85
77. McDowell, 236 N.C. at 398, 72 S.E.2d at 862.
78. 198 N.C. 635, 152 S.E. 888 (1930). For a discussion of Glliam and the Eways court's
reliance on it, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
79. Eways, 326 N.C. at 558, 391 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting Eways v. Governor's Island, 95 N.C.
App. 201, 204, 382 S.E.2d 219, 220 (1989), aff'd, 326 N.C. 552, 391 S.E.2d 182 (1990)). Applying
these policies to the dispute before it, the Eways court observed that "if these suits both had been
filed in state court, the prior pending action would serve to abate the subsequent action." Id. at 559,
391 S.E.2d at 186.
80. See, eg., Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 182-82, 139 S.E.2d 217, 219 (1964) (prior
action pending in South Carolina court); In re Skipper, 261 N.C. 592, 593, 135 S.E.2d 671, 671
(1964) (same).
81. See, eg., Cushing, 263 N.C. at 186-87, 139 S.E.2d at 222 ("Where another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause is made the basis of a plea in abatement, the former
action must be pending... within this State, in order to bar the second action.... Therefore,...
defendant's plea in abatement cannot be sustained.") (citations omitted).
82. Skipper, 261 N.C. at 594, 135 S.E.2d at 672.
83. See McDowell v. Blythe Bros. Co., 236 N.C. 396, 398, 72 S.E.2d 860, 862 (1952); Cameron
v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 84, 68 S.E.2d 796, 798 (1952).
84. Lehrer v. Edgecombe Mfg. Co., 13 N.C. App. 412, 415, 185 S.E.2d 727, 730 (1972). But cf.
Motor Inn Management, Inc. v. Irwin-Fuller Dev. Co., 46 N.C. App. 707, 712, 266 S.E.2d 368, 371,
disc, rev. denied, 301 N.C. 93, 275 S.E.2d 299 (1980) (state courts should avoid hearing "imported
lawsuits having little or no connection with the forum" and so should employ doctrine of forum non
conveniens to restrict litigants to the state court of origin).
85. See, eg., A. M. Sloan Co. v. McDowell, 75 N.C. 37, 37-38 (1876) (prior action pending in
federal court located in Georgia); Lehrer, 13 N.C. App. at 412, 185 S.E.2d at 728 (prior action
pending in federal court located in New York).
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As with an action involving the courts of two different states, abatement of the
second suit is improper here.8 6 More than a century ago, the North Carolina
Supreme Court expressed the following rationale for a rule prohibiting abate-
ment in this situation:
The provision ... allowing as cause for demurrer that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
must be confined to the courts of the State, where the remedies are
precisely the same; the object being to protect parties from vexation
and the courts from multiplicity of suits. But in different states or gov-
ernments the remedies are not the same, and there may be reasons why
our courts should not take notice of proceedings outside of the State
which would be applicable to our courts.8 7
In reaching its decision, the Eways court relied upon the rationale of the
three traditional situations when confronted with a fourth situation: A prior
action remains pending in a federal court that sits in the same state where the
parties are engaged in a subsequent state action.88 In this situation, the jurisdic-
tions are split over the question whether the prior pending federal action will
abate the subsequent state action under those circumstances.8 9 The Eways court
adopted the minority rule, declaring that the second action must be abated or
dismissed. 90
The Supreme Court's 1938 holding in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins91 pro-
vides the necessary foundation for the adoption of the minority rule. Since Erie,
federal courts sitting in diversity have, with a few limited exceptions, 92 applied
86. Lehrer, 13 N.C. App. at 414, 185 S.E.2d at 729. The court of appeals in Lehrer indicated
the following general rule:
"The pendency of a prior action between the same parties for the same cause of action
in a state court of competent jurisdiction works an abatement of a subsequent action either
in the same court or in another court of this state having jurisdiction. The prior action
must be pending in a court of this state .... "
Id. (quoting 1 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDaX, Abatement and Revival, § 3 (2d ed. 1967)).
The Lehrer court looked to the North Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Kesterson v. Southern
Ry., 146 N.C. 276, 59 S.E. 871 (1907), which embraced the rule that an action pending in a federal
court cannot be pleaded in abatement of a similar suit in a state court. Lehrer, 13 N.C. App. at 415,
185 S.E.2d at 729 (citing Kesterson, 146 N.C. at 277, 59 S.E. at 871).
87. A.M. Sloan, 75 N.C. at 40. Such a rationale also may undergird the rule applicable to a
situation involving a prior action from a different state.
88. Eways, 326 N.C. at 559, 391 S.E.2d at 186.
89. Id. at 560, 391 S.E.2d at 186; see, eg., Interstate Chem. Corp. v. Home Guano Co., 199
Ala. 583, 586, 75 So. 166, 168 (1917) (minority rule); Hubbs v. Nichols, 201 Tenn. 304, 309, 298
S.W.2d 801, 803 (1956) (majority rule).
90. Eways, 326 N.C. at 560, 391 S.E.2d at 187.
91. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie Court held the following:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to
be applied in any case is the law of the State.... There is no federal general common law.
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State
whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the
law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the
federal courts.
Id. at 78.
92. For example, under the "choice of law" exception, a federal court may apply the laws of a
state other than the state in which it sits. This is so because a federal court is to apply the laws that
the courts of the state in which it sits would apply, even if that state is applying, under conflict of
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the laws of the states in which they sit. Thus, when the minority rule restricts a
state-court litigant to a federal forum, state law nonetheless applies to resolve
the dispute, and the parties' rights and available remedies will be the same, re-
gardless of the judicial forum. Because of Erie, the rule requiring dismissal is an
appropriate reaction of a state court to the pendency of a duplicative federal
action, even a bankruptcy case, since federal courts, even bankruptcy courts,
routinely apply state law.93
Scarcely any of the cases to which the Eways court looked as authority,
however, were decided since Erie, since the development of federal abstention
doctrine, or since Congress enacted the bankruptcy abstention provisions in
1984.94 The court's overwhelming reliance on outdated cases to guide its adju-
dication of Eways underscores its failure to recognize the importance of Eways'
abstention context.
The most obvious example of the North Carolina Supreme Court's mis-
placed reliance on obsolete cases is the emphasis the court placed on its 1930
decision in Gilliam v. Sanders.95 Both the supreme court and the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals relied on Gilliam in affirming dismissal of plaintiff's com-
plaint.96 Indeed, the court of appeals considered itself "bound by Gilliam
because it is indistinguishable from the present case."' 97 Like Eways, Gilliam
involved a suit against a defaulting purchaser at a bankruptcy sale.98 Giliam,
however, is not "indistinguishable" from Eways. Several significant Supreme
Court decisions and acts of Congress have changed the law since the North
Carolina Supreme Court decided Gilliam, rendering Gilliam's rule powerless in
a case such as Eways.
The dispute in Gilliam had its roots in a bankruptcy proceeding in the Dis-
trict Court of the United States for the Middle District of North Carolina.99
laws principles, the laws of another state. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941).
93. See, eg., General Instrument Corp. v. Financial & Business Servs., Inc. (In re Finley), 62
Bankr. 361, 368 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (bankruptcy court constantly called upon to apply state
law); see also Hill, supra note 58, at 1020 (federal bankruptcy system is "little more than a system of
equitable distribution superimposed upon legal relationships having their origin for the most part in
state law").
94. The Eways court relied upon two very recent cases for principles unrelated to abstention:
Clark v. Craven Regional Medical Auth., 326 N.C. 15, 21, 387 S.E.2d 168, 172 (1990), and Shore v.
Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989). See Eways, 326 N.C. at 554, 558, 391 S.E.2d
at 183, 185. No other case upon which the Eways court relies is more recent than 1958. See Eways,
326 N.C. at 554, 391 S.E.2d at 183 (citing State ex rel. East Lenoir Sanitary Dist. v. City of Lenoir,
249 N.C. 96, 105 S.E.2d 411 (1958)).
95. 198 N.C. 635, 152 S.E. 888 (1930).
96. See Eways, 326 N.C. at 558, 391 S.E.2d at 185; Eways v. Governor's Island, 95 N.C, App.
201, 203, 382 S.E.2d 219, 220 (1989), aff'd, 326 N.C. 552, 391 S.E.2d 182 (1990).
97. Eways, 95 N.C. App. at 204, 382 S.E.2d at 221.
98. Gilliam, 198 N.C. at 636, 152 S.E. at 889.
99. Id. at 635, 152 S.E. at 889. The plaintiff in Gilliam was the court-appointed trustee in the
bankruptcy proceeding. Id. In Eways, a debtor-in-possession, rather than a court-appointed trustee,
was managing the bankruptcy sale proceedings. See Eways, 326 N.C. at 554, 391 S.E.2d at 183.
This difference, however, is unimportant as a debtor-in-possession selling its own property at a bank-
ruptcy auction is, like a trustee, not a private party but a fiduciary operating under court control.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988) ("[A] debtor in possession shall ... perform all the functions and
duties... of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.").
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Defendant had bid on property of the bankrupt estate at a court-ordered auc-
tion, but had failed to comply with his bid; as in Eways, the price the property
fetched at a second sale was much lower than defendant's bid. I10 In Gilliam the
plaintiff, the court-appointed trustee in bankruptcy, sued the defaulting pur-
chaser of estate property in state court instead of seeking relief in the federal
bankruptcy proceeding.10 1 In Eways, by contrast, the defendant in federal court
brought suit in state court for his tort and contract actions only when the district
court chose to abstain. 102 Thus, policy concerns such as preventing a "multi-
plicity of suits" and preventing a defendant from "being unnecessarily harassed
and subjected to additional costs by two proceedings," 10 3 which were important
to the court's decision in Gilliam, were not relevant in Eways.
The North Carolina Supreme Court decided Gilliam in 1930,104 before
three essential developments in the law: the United States Supreme Court's
1938 Erie decision,105 the Supreme Court's formulation of abstention doc-
trine,10 6 and, more recently, congressional enactment of the bankruptcy ab-
stention provisions in 1984.107 An understanding of each of these three
developments is crucial to a correct resolution of the issues in Eways; thus, a
decision such as Gilliam, coming from the pre-Erie, pre-Pullman, pre-statutory-
abstention era, is of very limited value for deciding Eways.
The same problem-relying on cases rendered irrelevant by changes in the
law-is evident in the Eways court's selection of cases from other jurisdictions
setting forth the minority rule. In adopting the rule requiring abatement of a
subsequent state action,108 the North Carolina Supreme Court looked to three
decisions from other states as persuasive authority: Interstate Chemical Corp. v.
Home Guano Co.,10 9 Wilson v. Milliken,'10 and Smith v. Atlantic Mutual Fire
Insurance Co.' 1 1 These three cases are very old: Smith was decided in 1850,112
Wilson in 1898,113 and Interstate Chemical in 1917.114 Thus, like Gilliam, each
100. Gilliam, 198 N.C. at 636, 152 S.E. at 889. In Gilliam, the bankruptcy court concluded that
the seller's damages were equal to this shortfall in purchase price. Id. In Eways, however, the
bankruptcy court limited the seller's damage to the security deposit specified in the sale contract as
liquidated damages. In re Governor's Island, 45 Bankr. 247, 258 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984). The
Gilliam opinion does not reveal whether the sale contract contained a liquidated damages provision.
101. Gilliam, 198 N.C. at 636, 152 S.E. at 889.
102. Eways, 326 N.C. at 556, 391 S.E.2d at 184.
103. Wilson v. Milliken, 103 Ky. 165, 172, 174, 44 S.W. 660, 662, 663 (1898). The Eways court
relied on Wilson as an example of the minority rule it adopted. See Eways, 326 N.C. at 560, 391
S.E.2d at 187.
104. See Gilliam, 198 N.C. at 635, 152 S.E. at 888.
105. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
106. See, eg., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); see also supra notes
40-43 and accompanying text (discussing Pullman abstention).
107. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(1984) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988)).
108. Eways, 326 N.C. at 560, 391 S.E.2d at 187.
109. 199 Ala. 583, 75 So. 166 (1917).
110. 103 Ky. 165, 44 S.W. 660 (1898).
111. 22 N.H. 21 (1850).
112. See Smith, 22 N.H. at 21.
113. See Wilson, 103 Ky. at 165, 44 S.W. at 660.
114. See Interstate Chemical, 199 Ala. at 583, 75 So. at 166.
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of these cases was decided before the rise to prominence of judicial abstention,
the Erie doctrine, and statutory abstention.115 Because these three develop-
ments bear significantly on Eways, decisions from an era when they were un-
known are unpersuasive. The Eways court would have done better to examine
some of the more recent cases from other jurisdictions following either the mi-
nority or the majority rule.' 16 The North Carolina Supreme Court's misplaced
reliance on outmoded cases in Eways is symptomatic of the opinion's central
defect: the court's complete failure to consider the relationship between its deci-
sion and federal court abstention. Because of this failure, the rule announced in
Eways undermines federal abstention policy in two different, yet equally troub-
ling ways. One result of Eways will prove problematic for the courts of this
state; the other result will be troubling to federal courts sitting in North Caro-
lina. Having erroneously proclaimed the rule requiring dismissal for prior ac-
tion pending, the court created an "all-or-nothing" situation in which state
courts will not be able to consider cases significant to the laws of this state, and
in which federal courts sitting in North Carolina will not be able to retain juris-
diction over cases properly brought before them.
First, the Eways rule eviscerates the basic abstention doctrine set forth in
Pullman,117 Burford,118 and Thibodaux.119 The Supreme Court created absten-
tion doctrine primarily out of respect for the states' own interests; 120 an opinion
such as Eways is, in effect, a reply of "No, thank you!" to the Supreme Court's
solicitude. The day undoubtedly will come when an issue of some importance to
North Carolina law arises in the context of a federal proceeding; if the federal
court then abstains (as it should) to allow North Carolina courts to pass on the
question, the state court, because of the Eways rule, will be forced to dismiss the
resulting state action. Thus, the Eways rule will backfire in a situation where it
is in North Carolina's interest for state courts to apply state law to a particular
dispute.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Madison Cablevi-
sion, Inc. v. City ofMorganton 12 1 presents a startling example of a case in which
the Eways rule will hamper North Carolina courts' ability to decide critical
state-law issues. Until Eways, Madison was the most recent reported North Car-
olina case involving federal abstention. In Madison, the North Carolina
115. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938); 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (1988).
116. See, eg., Fludd v. Tiller, 184 Ga. App. 93, 93, 360 S.E.2d 647, 647 (1987) ("[ihe pendency
of a prior federal action generally is not a bar to a state action by the same plaintiff against the same
defendant for the same cause of action.") (majority rule); Barringer v. Zgoda, 91 A.D.2d 811, 811,
458 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (1982) (affirming dismissal of state court action when prior action was pending
between the same parties in federal court) (minority rule).
117. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499-501; see also supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (discussing
Pullman abstention).
118. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943); see supra note 44.
119. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27-30 (1959); see also
supra note 44 (discussing Thibodaux abstention).
120. See, eg., Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 27-30 (abstention appropriate when case presented difficult
questions of state law bearing on important policy issues).
121. 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).
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Supreme Court construed several clauses of the state constitution to determine
whether it should permit a North Carolina town to own and operate a cable
television system.122 Madison Cablevision's complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of North Carolina alleged violations of the
North Carolina Constitution as well as of federal statutes and of the United
States Constitution; 123 the federal court concluded that the claims based on the
public purpose and antimonopoly provisions of the North Carolina Constitution
should go before a state court. 124 The federal judge retained jurisdiction of the
dispute but abstained from deciding the federal claims pending submission of the
state claims to the state court. 125 The North Carolina Supreme Court resolved
Madison Cablevision's claims by concluding, inter alia, that the town's actions
did not violate the North Carolina Constitution. 126 The court decided Madison
in December, 1989;127 if a North Carolina court had confronted Madison a mere
six months later-following the Eways decision-it would have had to dismiss
Madison Cable's state court complaint because of the pending action in federal
court. A rule requiring a North Carolina court to dismiss a state action when
construction of the North Carolina Constitution is necessary is obviously flawed.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in trying to further "judicial economy," 128
has hamstrung itself in its ability to serve as the final arbiter of the laws of its
state. 129
The Eways decision also undermines federal abstention policy by circum-
122. Id. at 636, 386 S.E.2d at 201; see generally Note, Municipal Ownership of Cable Television
System" Madison Cablevision, In. v. City of Morganton, 68 N.C.L. REv. 1295 (1990) (analyzing the
supreme court's decision to allow the town to operate the cable system as a "public service").
123. Madison, 325 N.C. 637, 386 S.E.2d at 201-02.
124. Id. at 641, 655, 382 S.E.2d at 204, 212; see also N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) ('The power of
taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public purposes only, and shall never
be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away."); id. art. I, § 34 ("[M]onopolies are contrary to the
genius of a free state and shall not be allowed."). See generally Note, supra note 122, at 1298 (dis-
cussing federal court's decision to abstain in Madison).
125. Madison, 325 N.C. at 638, 386 S.E.2d at 202.
126. Id. at 636, 386 S.E.2d at 201.
127. See id. at 634, 386 S.E.2d at 200.
128. Eways, 326 N.C. at 561, 391 S.E.2d at 187.
129. Yet another situation in which the Eways rule would hinder North Carolina courts' ability
to apply state law arose in Ratcliff v. County of Buncombe, 759 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1985). In
Ratcliff, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Pullman abstention was
applicable to a dispute involving the meaning of a North Carolina statute. Id. at 1186-87. Accord-
ingly, the federal-court plaintiff filed an action in state court seeking construction of the statute, see
Ratcliff v. County of Buncombe, 81 N.C. App. 153, 154, 343 S.E.2d 601, 602, appeal dismissed, 318
N.C. 417, 349 S.E.2d 599 (1986), while the first suit remained pending in federal court. Ratcliff, 759
F.2d at 1184. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the state trial court's dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint on the ground that plaintiff, having claimed benefits under the statute, could
not then question its constitutionality. Ratcliff, 81 N.C. App. at 155, 343 S.E.2d at 602-03. Under
the rigid procedural rule of Eways, however, the state court would not have been able to apply this
principle of North Carolina law to reach its conclusion, but would have been required to dismiss the
state-court suit on the ground of prior action pending. The federal court in Ratcliffabstained under
the Pullman doctrine, see Rateliff, 759 F.2d at 1186-87, whereas the federal court inEways abstained
pursuant to federal statutory authority, see Eways, 326 N.C. at 556, 391 S.E.2d at 185; see also
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (discussing the importance of avoiding
"needless friction with state policies"); 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (1988) (authorizing abstention). The
procedural presentation to a state court resulting from either of these types of abstention is identical
from the standpoint of the doctrine of prior action pending.
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scribing the abstention decisions of federal courts sitting in North Carolina.
Faced with the Eways rule, federal courts sitting in North Carolina will have no
choice but to dismiss cases before them if they wish to assure that litigants' state
court claims will receive a state court hearing.130 As in Harris County Commis-
sioners Court v. Moore,131 federal courts in North Carolina will face "obstacles
to state-court jurisdiction" calling for dismissal by the federal court, rather than
abstention with a retention ofjurisdiction. 132 Eways' rule of abatement is a total
obstacle because under Eways, whenever a prior action is pending in federal
court, even following an abstention, North Carolina courts must dismiss the
action. Indeed, because the supreme court announced the rule requiring dismis-
sal in the context of an abstention, state courts may conclude in the future that
the requirement of dismissal is particularly applicable when a federal court has
abstained. 133 The Eways rule thus presents a direct challenge to federal absten-
tion doctrine.
Following Eways, a federal court sitting in North Carolina may assure
state-court determination of complex state-law issues in only one manner: by
dismissing the federal suit. The United States Supreme Court, however, has
termed retention of jurisdiction following abstention the "proper course."' 134
Federal-court dismissal may defeat a litigant's legitimate invocation of federal
jurisdiction. 135 Total dismissal of the federal suit may result in injustice; for
example, parties returning to federal court at the conclusion of state court pro-
ceedings may be barred by the statute of limitations 136 or find certain relief un-
available to them.1 37 In addition, in a bankruptcy case, the federal court may
not close the case until the estate has been "fully administered."' 138 Thus, a
United States Bankruptcy Court sitting in North Carolina wishing to ensure
state-court determination of state-law issues will find itself impaled upon the
horns of a dilemma: it cannot dismiss the bankruptcy case prematurely, nor can
it abstain while retaining jurisdiction because the state court, under the Eways
rule, will dismiss the resulting state-court action. If a federal court concludes
that it cannot dismiss the action, it will retain all claims and, in clear contradilc-
130. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 35, § 52, at 17 (describing federal court's dismissal of
cases in which retention of jurisdiction would interfere with obtaining a state court decision).
131. 420 U.S. 77 (1975). For a discussion of Harris, see supra notes 48-53 and accompanying
text.
132. Harris, 420 U.S. at 88.
133. In other words, because of its context, the Eways rule carries a stronger mandate-rather
than seeming to require dismissal even when a federal court has abstained, Eways seems to require
dismissal particularly when a federal court has abstained.
134. Ainerican Trial Lawyers' Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467, 469 (1973).
135. See generally Mullenix, supra note 37, at 117 (describing how abstention maneuvers may
work to "bar an opponent from a legitimately invoked federal forum").
136. Eg., Houston v. Trans Union Credit Information Co., 154 A.D.2d 312, 313, 546 N.Y.S.2d
600, 601 (1989) ("[A]ny State claims which are still actionable at the conclusion of the Federal
matter may be vulnerable to Statute of Limitations challenges.").
137. See, eg., Lister v. Lucey, 575 F.2d 1325, 1332 (7th Cir.) (federal court dismissed action
returned to it from state court, as plaintiffs were bound by procedural error in state law), cert,
denied, 439 U.S. 865 (1978). For a party wishing to return to federal court following the conclusion
of state proceedings, dismissal of the first federal suit also would produce delay, as well as the addi-
tional filing fees and legal costs needed for a second, separate federal suit.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) (1988).
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tion of the Supreme Court's expressed policy, determine difficult, unsettled ques-
tions of state law. 1 3 9 Eways' "all-or-nothing" rule will prove troublesome as
long as federal abstention doctrine remains the law of the land; the Eways rule
will force federal district courts in North Carolina to disregard the Supreme
Court's clearly-expressed policy.
The Eways court's failure to recognize the importance of abstention. doc-
trine and its underlying federalist principles renders the rule it announced funda-
mentally flawed. A rule requiring dismissal of a state court action when a prior
action is pending in federal court, announced in the context of a federal court
abstention, has no vitality. Erie's assurance that a federal court will apply the
law of the state in which it sits provides the necessary foundation for the minor-
ity rule,140 but the North Carolina Supreme Court should not have used Eways
as its vehicle for adopting the minority rule. If North Carolina needs a rule
requiring dismissal, the court should readopt it in an appropriate context: for
example, in a case in which the federal judge has not abstained. The court also
should state specifically that the rule is inapplicable in the context of an absten-
tion, and should make clear the policy reasons underlying such a rule. 141 In
their "ordinary administration of civil and criminal justice," the courts of North
Carolina, like those of all other states, are doing nothing less than mixing the
"great cement of society."' 142 State courts, therefore, must take care what rules
they announce, lest these rules threaten basic federalist principles.
LAURA STAPLES WOODWORTH
139. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 (1959); see also Zbaraz v.
Quern, 572 F.2d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 1978) (federal court reversed abstention order because federal-
court plaintiffs might not have been able to raise same claims in same manner in state court), cert.
denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980).
140. See Erie I.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (federal courts sitting in diversity are to
apply the law of the state in which they sit); see also supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text
(discussing the Erie rule's relevance to a state court's decision whether to dismiss an action when a
prior action is pending in federal court within the same state).
141. Such policy goals might include that of "reliev[ing] litigants of the burden of defending two
separate actions." F. & F. Laboratories, Inc., v. Chocolate Spraying Co., 6 111. App. 2d 299, 302, 127
N.E.2d 682, 683 (1955). This goal clearly is unimportant in Eways, as the federal-court defendant
initiated the state-court action pursuant to the district court's abstention order.
142. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 120 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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